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FUTURE CARRIER AVIATION OPTIONS
A British Perspective
David J. Jordan
One of the key debates that face naval aviation in the twenty-first centuryrelates to its key equipment: the airplane. The United States is the only
power that will be able to deploy a carrier force of any size, and it has held this
position for over two decades. Soviet/Russian ambitions to deploy a blue-water
air capability have been downsized, rationalised, abandoned, then reinstated
under the threat of cancelation, and now lack funding. The People’s Republic of
China is known to aspire to develop its naval aviation through the procurement
of aircraft carriers, but it has made little obvious progress. While aircraft carriers
enable the projection of airpower well beyond a nation’s shores without reliance
on host-nation support, they have a major problem: they are expensive. De-
signing, running, and upgrading carriers are beyond the financial capacity of
most nations. Only a few have the ability to deploy combat aircraft at sea, and the
conventional aircraft carrier can only be procured in small numbers. While the
United States can, within the politics of budget constraints, present a formidable
air presence from carrier decks, the United Kingdom and France, the two
middle-ranking powers with aspirations to maintain
aircraft carriers, have been obliged by cost consider-
ations to make some uncomfortable decisions.
Furthermore, there are continuing questions
about the necessity of aircraft carriers for middle-
ranking powers. It is argued that the aircraft carrier,
by virtue of its considerable cost, is an unnecessary
luxury. Under this scenario, the United Kingdom
and France are perceived as being unlikely to em-
bark upon independent naval operations but as
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instead contributing to task forces dominated by the U.S. Navy, which in
turn would provide the aviation assets. Practical experience, particularly for
Britain, suggests that this view is dangerous.
Nonetheless, Britain’s experience of carrier aviation since the mid-1960s has
not been altogether happy. A combination of a reduced world role and serious
economic problems led to the downsizing of all British military services, with
particularly savage cuts in the 1964–70 period. The aircraft carrier was deemed
to be an expensive irrelevance. This view was shortsighted, ignoring the fact that
Britain had a number of commitments and obligations in areas that had been
brought into the ambit of Britain’s concerns through trade and colonialism. As
always, plans failed to survive contact with the enemy—in this case, Argentina in
1982, when the only means of recovering the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas)
was an amphibious operation. Since that time, despite ever-diminishing defence
budgets, the aircraft carrier has returned to prominence, with the 1998 Strategic
Defence Review (SDR) planning for two carriers capable of embarking around fifty
aircraft, thus enhancing the deployability of British forces and increasing flexibility.
Nonetheless, there are a number of issues that need to be settled before the
new vessels enter service in 2012. This article (based on the state of affairs in late
1999) seeks to provide a general outline of the options facing British naval avia-
tion in the next ten to twenty years. It does not claim to be definitive but seeks to
inform, highlighting in particular the manner in which the aircraft carrier has
returned to the core of British military thinking as Britain adjusts to the condi-
tions likely to pertain in the first two decades of the twenty-first century.
BRITAIN AND NAVAL AVIATION SINCE 1960: THE BACKGROUND
Decline has been a particularly notable factor in the United Kingdom, where
cost considerations led to the abandonment of conventional-takeoff-and-landing
(CTOL) aircraft carriers when HMS Ark Royal was retired in 1978. This was not
a sudden decision.
The Decline of the British Carrier Force
The first threat to British naval aviation came in the 1960s. In 1957, a whole
swathe of advanced aircraft projects had been canceled on the grounds of cost
and a belief that their job would soon be done by missiles. Hawker-Siddeley Avi-
ation’s P.1127, an innovative vertical/short-takeoff-and-landing (VSTOL) air-
craft, was allowed to survive. The P.1127 was designed to prove the validity of
VSTOL and was not intended for operational service. However, a derivative,
the P.1154, was proposed by Hawker in 1962; it was finally abandoned in 1964,
in favour of the F-4K Phantom.
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It is arguable that the P.1154 had too much stacked against it. There appears
to have been a suspicion amongst senior officers that a capable, supersonic
VSTOL aircraft might have allowed a cost-conscious government to abandon a
then-projected carrier design (known as the CVA-01) and replace it with smaller
ships that could operate VSTOL air wings. The theory continues that the Admi-
ralty had no intention of giving up its large carriers and agitated against the
P.1154. This may or may not be true. What is not beyond dispute is that the Royal
Air Force and the Royal Navy had completely different views on how the air-
craft should be equipped; the na-
val P.1154 would have been a very
different one from the RAF’s.1 In
addition, the P.1154 was a techni-
cal risk. The P.1127 had not vali-
dated the concept of VSTOL at this point, and the notion of moving from a
technology demonstrator with relatively simple equipment to a fully operational,
supersonic type (the P.1154) was highly adventurous. Finally, there was already a
superb, proven naval type in operational service—namely, the Phantom.2 The
Phantom could be operated from the existing carrier fleet (with modifications),
and it would obviously be fully compatible with CVA-01 from the start.3
CVA-01, in spite of its innovative design, was vulnerable.4 The Royal Navy
had five carriers (Ark Royal, Centaur, Eagle, Hermes, and Victorious) when Prime
Minister Harold Wilson took office, plus two more (Albion and Bulwark) that
had been converted into “commando carriers.”5 Of these seven vessels, only the
Ark Royal and Eagle were large enough to accommodate the Phantom.6
After a period of financial crisis, Wilson’s government decided to end the
British military presence “East of Suez,” a conclusion that made the aircraft car-
rier an endangered species. In 1966, CVA-01 was canceled. While modifications
to allow the operation of Phantoms from the existing vessels were financed, the
carriers were not to be replaced. It was then decided that Eagle would not be
modified to embark the Phantom.7 By the mid-1970s, it was clear that Britain
would be left with only an antisubmarine helicopter force after Ark Royal’s
withdrawal from service.
The argument put forward against complaints that this decision was short-
sighted took the form that Britain’s reduced military commitments meant that
naval operations where airpower would be required—opposed amphibious
landings—would be coalition operations. The aviation assets required would
come from the U.S. Navy’s carriers. Where the U.S. Navy was unavailable, the
RAF would defend the fleet from land bases. This was a spurious idea, as the
Royal Air Force did not have any suitable aircraft available for this task.8 In the
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event of a war, the RAF would be busy elsewhere, and the Navy would have to
hope that a U.S. carrier was nearby.
Consequently, the Royal Navy looked for alternatives. It became clear that the
problem would be twofold. First, the government had to be convinced that a
class of air-capable vessels was necessary; second, a suitable aircraft had to be
found. The second problem was the easier to solve. The P.1127 had been devel-
oped into the Harrier, via a type known as the Kestrel.9 The Harrier entered service
with the RAF in 1969. The U.S. Marine Corps placed an order (for the AV-8A)
shortly afterward. Neither the RAF nor the Marine Corps envisaged using the
Harrier as a fighter aircraft, even though Marine machines were wired for the
AIM-9 Sidewinder.
The Royal Navy, faced with the choice of a navalised Harrier or nothing,
decided upon VSTOL carriers. The major difficulty was to obtain the necessary
vessels. Fortunately, in the late 1960s a new class of antisubmarine cruiser, the
Invincible-class CVSG, was being designed.10 These already had a full-length
flight deck and an island (for helicopter operations); Hawker-Siddeley Aviation
was contracted to develop a minimum-change version of the Harrier to equip
them. The modifications included the provision of radar and a raised canopy for
better vision in air combat. The Sea Harrier entered service in 1979, some six
years after the idea for its method of launching—off a “ski ramp”—had been ar-
rived at.11
The decision to develop a VSTOL fighter for the Royal Navy was not met with
universal acclaim. Many felt that the Harrier offered little real military capability
beyond being able to be based close to the front line without prepared runways.
It was also noted that the proposed complement of aircraft for Invincible was less
than half that of the Ark Royal. However, although the withdrawal of all but Ark
Royal left the Navy with only around thirty fixed-wing aircraft, even this small
force could have been useful. In the end, the only concession to demands to re-
tain Ark Royal was the announcement that the name would be used for the third
Invincible-class ship.12 This did not appear to be a sensible solution to the under-
lying problem of a capability gap. By 1980, the Navy had Invincible and also Her-
mes, which had been converted from the commando carrier role into an interim
VSTOL vessel.13
Four years after Ark Royal was retired, Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands.
The only way to recover the Falklands was through an amphibious operation,
and the Ark Royal would have proved invaluable. Although by comparison to a
U.S. carrier air wing Ark Royal’s aircraft complement was small, a fixed-wing
carrier would have provided the task force with strike aircraft, air defence
fighters with a beyond-visual-range (BVR) missile capability, and, crucially, air-
borne early warning (AEW) aircraft.14 As the conflict progressed, it was clear
6 6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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that all were desirable.15 As it was, the two aircraft carriers despatched (Hermes
and Invincible) carried fewer combat aircraft than Ark Royal had done.16 No air-
borne early warning capability was available, and the most potent weapon car-
ried by the Sea Harriers was the AIM-9 Sidewinder.17
It is hardly necessary to recount that the Sea Harriers performed beyond all
expectations, with not a single one being lost in air combat, while over twenty
Argentine aircraft were claimed as shot down. In addition, the RAF version of
the Harrier, then in its GR 3 incarnation, was successfully operated from the
deck of HMS Hermes in the ground-attack role. The Sea Harrier and Harrier
proved capable of operating in weather conditions that would have grounded
other carrier-aircraft types, assisted by their ability to recover vertically onto the
carrier deck rather than having to undergo the ordeal of arrested landings. Thus
the concept of the VSTOL (more accurately, “short takeoff and vertical landing,”
or STOVL) carrier was largely vindicated by the Falklands conflict. However, a
number of problems were identified.18
Lessons from the Falklands
The most obvious problem with the STOVL carrier was the lack of AEW aircraft.19
The lack of airborne early warning had made it possible for the Argentine pilots
(air force and naval) to conduct daring attacks on the British task force, with
minimal warning for defending combat air patrols (CAPs).20 As a result, the car-
riers had to be positioned farther from the combat area than was desirable.21
Further, the Sea Harrier’s light armament—two AIM-9s and two 30 mm ADEN
cannon—gave it only limited combat persistence.22 This had not been a serious
problem over the Falklands, but it was recognised that in different circum-
stances it might have been; after the war, this shortcoming was tackled with
the provision of twin missile-launcher rails, doubling the number of Side-
winders carried. Finally, although the Sea Harrier’s Blue Fox radar per-
formed beyond expectations, it was clear that a “look-down/shoot-down”
BVR capability was desirable.
None of these problems would have arisen with the old Ark Royal: its Phan-
toms had had beyond-visual-range capability; the endurance of its combat air
patrols had been extended through “buddy” refuelling (that is, from aircraft
other than specialised tankers) by suitably equipped Blackburn Buccaneers; and
airborne early warning had been provided by Fairey Gannet AEW 3s.
In the absence of conventional-takeoff-and-landing vessels, these lessons led to
the development of the Sea Harrier F/A 2, which remains today the operational
variant. The Sea Harrier F/A 2 is an impressive machine. Its performance in exer-
cises has been remarkable. The F/A 2 is certified for the full range of attack mis-
sions, but the deployment of Harrier GR 7 (roughly equivalent to the AV-8B
J O R D A N 6 7
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night-attack variant) from RAF units for attack missions is now commonplace,
leaving the Sea Harriers for air-to-air operations.23 All RAF and Navy Harriers
are now under a single command, Joint Force Harrier. With the Sea Harrier tak-
ing responsibility for air-to-air missions and the GR 7, with a larger weapon
load, undertaking attack operations, the Royal Navy now has a suitable mix of
aircraft for its carriers.24 Experience has finally muted the criticism of the em-
ployment of STOVL vessels, at least in U.K. circles.25
The major problem facing the Royal Navy is that its carriers are too small.
They cannot carry large air wings; they struggle to carry more than twenty air-
craft. Thus, the Navy cannot have enough aircraft available on the scene of a cri-
sis. The comparatively small size of its air wings reduces the number of sorties
that can be generated, in turn reducing the carriers’ effectiveness. There are only
two carriers in service at any one time (the third being in “deep maintenance,” or
overhaul), which does not help matters. Consequently, although they are effec-
tive and have given good service, the Invincible-class carriers are not the best ad-
vertisement for STOVL types. The fact that the aircraft are good is obscured by
the limited operations that can be carried out. This has led to the view that the
STOVL aircraft carrier can in no way equal the versatility and flexibility of a
CTOL vessel. To be allowed to exploit STOVL’s full potential, the Royal Navy re-
quired larger aircraft carriers. Defence spending policies in the 1980s and 1990s,
however, meant that it was most unlikely to receive them.
Since the Invincible-class vessels are not due for replacement until around
2010, there has been until recently little consideration of what would follow
them. With the end of the Cold War, British defence policy entered a period of
confusion, as the government cut spending. Unfortunately, British military
commitments did not diminish. Beginning with DESERT STORM, British forces
became engaged in Iraq and Kuwait, as well as in the former Yugoslavia, protect-
ing the safe haven established for the Iraqi Kurds, and patrolling the Iraqi no-fly
zones. This was in addition to the tasks that they normally carried out. It became
increasingly clear that asking British forces to do more with fewer personnel and
less equipment was not a viable idea. This provoked the Labour opposition to
promise that it would embark upon a Strategic Defence Review (SDR) if it were
to be elected at the next general election. This duly occurred on 1 May 1997, and
the enormous Labour victory meant that the SDR was likely to pass through
Parliament without serious difficulties.
FUTURE AIRPOWER OPTIONS FOR THE ROYAL NAVY
The need for the United Kingdom to possess aircraft carriers has been questioned
by a number of sources in recent years. A variety of critics have suggested that
the British aircraft carrier is no longer necessary. Pundits in national newspapers
6 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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argued that the aircraft carrier is an expensive luxury and that the money needed
for a new class of vessels could be better employed elsewhere.
The Strategic Defence Review and the Need for British Carriers
The SDR suggested otherwise. The review took longer to complete than had
been anticipated in some quarters (as a result, it is rumoured, of objections from
the Treasury), but it ultimately declared that the United Kingdom needed new
aircraft carriers. The SDR changed the emphasis for British naval forces, moving
away from the large-scale, open-ocean warfare for which it had been training for
the past fifty years to force-projection and littoral operations in conjunction
with the other two services. The SDR also made clear that the greatest impor-
tance would be attached to versatility and deployability.
It was obvious that the aircraft carrier would be integral to this vision. The
SDR laid down proposals to procure “two large aircraft carriers capable of oper-
ating up to fifty fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters” from all three services. It
should be noted here that what Britain considers a “large aircraft carrier” is dif-
ferent from what the United States does. For the Royal Navy, a “large” carrier has
been the size of HMS Eagle or the old Ark Royal (53,000 tons fully loaded), able
to carry between thirty and forty fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters. This is
hardly “large” in comparison with the U.S. Navy’s aircraft carriers, since even the
Midway (70,000 tons fully loaded) was larger than the British vessels. Still, the
two carriers, scheduled to enter service in about 2012, will provide Britain with
the ability independently to deploy combat forces to trouble spots. This is im-
portant, since there are reasons for Britain to deploy independently. Britain’s
previous role as an imperial nation has left a legacy of close ties with former col-
onies. Some ten million British citizens live overseas, and there are thirteen de-
pendent territories for which Britain is responsible. The need to be able to
project military power to defend these interests or to provide aid to them is a
clear reason for procuring newer, more capable carriers. In many instances, the
infrastructure does not exist to support aviation operations in or around the
overseas territories; the only means of sending aviation assets to such regions
and then operating them is by means of a carrier deck.26
In addition to these direct responsibilities, Britain is a member of a number
of international organisations, most notably the UN, Nato, and the Common-
wealth. It is possible to envisage an attack on a Commonwealth country by a
neighbour leading to British intervention, either on the side of the nation at-
tacked or to impose or maintain a peace agreement. Although the SDR specifi-
cally denies that Britain seeks a role as world policeman, it asserts that there are
compelling reasons for Britain not to be isolationist in outlook. The level of Brit-
ish overseas investment, particularly in the developing world (where British
J O R D A N 6 9
7
Jordan: Future Carrier Aviation Options
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2001
investment amounts to the combined total of those of France, Germany, and It-
aly), demands that attention be paid to an ability to intervene in crises in these
areas. Britain’s dependence on worldwide trade makes it essential for Britain to
be able to defend its interests by the rapid projection of power to areas where
conflict threatens to destabilise or damage them.27
SDR foresees the close integration of all three services: “By 2015, the Review
expects further major change in modern warfare. Operations will no longer be
characterised as land, sea or air. There will instead be a single battlespace in
which land, maritime and air forces will be directed, targeted and supplemented
by a new generation of intelligence, surveillance, information and communica-
tions systems offering a steep change in military capability.”28
Although this view presumes the development of new equipment and new
technologies, the emphasis here is on the joint nature of future operations. This
has already been manifested in the creation of the joint Harrier force.29 This is
not all. The Royal Navy is adopting what is termed a “golf bag” approach to
carrier-based aviation assets. The task force commander (the “golfer”) chooses
the air assets (the “clubs”) needed to carry out the task at hand. The carriers
deploy with the necessary mix of aircraft and helicopters. This might mean that
the only helicopters carried would be the airborne-early-warning type, with an-
tisubmarine helicopters being based on other vessels (for instance, HMS Ocean),
if they were required at all. Thus the air wing might be made up of about sixteen
Sea Harriers plus AEW helicopters. Alternatively, there might be a mix of Harrier
GR 7s, Apache ground-attack helicopters, and a smaller number of Sea Harriers
for operations where air defence was secondary to supporting troops. Addi-
tionally, the RAF’s support helicopter force (now amalgamated into a joint com-
mand of army, navy, and air force transport helicopter assets) has operated the
Boeing Chinook from the Invincible class, so the carriers might be employed in a
role akin to that of the American amphibious assault ship (LPH). The provision
of a new carrier will make this “golf bag” approach even more viable, since it will
make more room for the aircraft required for the mission.30
The issue now at hand is what type of carrier the new vessel should be. Nei-
ther the Strategic Defence Review nor any subsequent official paper has speci-
fied this in any way. Various proposals are being sought from industry, and it is
unlikely that the type of vessel will be chosen until 2001 at the earliest.
The CV(F) and the FCBA
It is supposed that the “UK Future Aircraft Carrier,” or CV(F), will be of the
short-takeoff-vertical-landing type, flying a “future carrierborne aircraft,” or
FCBA, of some appropriate type. However, as far as is currently known, the
Royal Navy could end up with a conventional-takeoff-and-landing vessel,
7 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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larger STOVL carriers, or what is known as a STOBAR ship—short takeoff
but arrested recovery.
The CTOL type would appear to offer a number of advantages, especially in
terms of the range of aircraft that can be embarked. Two suitable naval aircraft
already exist—although not yet in frontline service—to equip this sort of car-
rier, namely, the Boeing F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet, and the Dassault Rafale M.
The Royal Navy’s previous decision to depend upon “buddy” refuelling suggests
that tankers would not be purchased and that strike/fighter types would likely
constitute most of an air wing of forty to fifty aircraft.
Nonetheless, the CTOL carrier seems unlikely. Arrested landings are regarded
as unnecessarily complicated by the Royal Navy after some twenty years’ experi-
ence of STOVL operations.31 There are other considerations. Steam catapults are
labour intensive, while an electromagnetic aircraft-launch system appears to
promise a reduction in the number of personnel involved. For a small force such
as the Royal Navy this might not be enough, however; its personnel levels are
such that any reduction in the complement of an aircraft carrier would be wel-
come. STOVL operations allow deck crews to be kept small; no catapult or ar-
resting personnel are required, and barriers are unnecessary. Furthermore,
electromagnetic launch might be too expensive or inadequately proven by the
time CV(F) has to be fitted out.
The key point that the Royal Navy’s conception of a large aircraft carrier is
different from that of the U.S. Navy must be noted once more. British aircraft
carriers, for instance, have tended to embark relatively few support aircraft. Ad-
vances in technology may allow support functions to be performed by heliborne
or tilt-rotor designs. Further, and perhaps most importantly, it is almost certain
that the CV(F) will not be nuclear powered.32
STOBAR Options
The short-takeoff-but-arrested-recovery design has a number of operational
problems. First, rapid flight operations are difficult unless an angled deck is em-
ployed. Even then, if the aircraft requires most of the flight deck to gain suffi-
cient velocity to fly, aircraft will be unable to land while launches are taking
place.33 A STOBAR carrier needs arresting gear, which, as noted, demands a large
deck crew at a time when the Royal Navy will be seeking to embark as small a
complement on the CV(F) as is viable.
Nonetheless, there is a reason for believing that the STOBAR option is not out
of the running. The Eurofighter Typhoon is currently the subject of a British
Aerospace study to assess its viability as a carrierborne aircraft, and it is quite
clear that although the study is at an early stage, it is being taken seriously.34 In
the past, attempts to convert land-based aircraft into carrier aircraft have not
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been entirely successful, particularly with regard to stresses imposed on the air-
frame—especially in landings, inasmuch as carrier aircraft typically strike flight
decks with greater force than land-based aircraft do runways. In the past, either
the airframe has not proved strong enough or the weight increases caused by
strengthening have imposed too-great penalties on performance.35
In the case of a STOBAR Typhoon, the considerations are a little different.
Structural strengthening would undoubtedly be required, but the weight in-
creases may be minimised thanks to advanced technology. The Typhoon’s ad-
vanced flight-control system could be programmed to reduce the stresses of
landing, particularly if integrated with a carrier-landing datalink. This would
have a number of advantages. For
instance, sudden pitching of the
carrier deck would be recognised
by the system, which would feed
in last-second control corrections,
ensuring that the aircraft landed
within set limits. This would permit the airframe to be strengthened only as
required for operations within those parameters—this, at least, is the theory
that the British Aerospace study will investigate. There is little doubt that the use
of thrust vectoring, already being planned for the Typhoon, coupled with a
high-lift wing design, could provide near-optimal short-takeoff-and-landing
capabilities for a “Sea Typhoon.” The use of a ski ramp would only enhance
STOL performance.
There is another reason why a STOBAR vessel employing the Typhoon might
not be out of the question—commonality. The Royal Air Force will be buying
232 Typhoons and has options for fifty more. The use of a navalised Typhoon
would simplify servicing and lower unit-procurement costs. In addition, the
United Kingdom would be the sole customer for the naval version; this would
put design authority into the hands of British Aerospace. Experience with up-
grading the RAF’s Jaguar strike aircraft (a collaborative project) has shown that
with a single design authority that is not obliged to consult a partner, costs go
down, and modifications arrive on time and on budget. In view of the chequered
history of the Typhoon’s design and its increased costs, a cynic could contend
that a navalised version unique to the United Kingdom, to be flown by a number
of RAF units as well as the Navy, would prove extremely tempting to the Minis-
try of Defence.36 It would certainly enhance the capability of a joint force built
around carriers. Reequipping the two Sea Harrier squadrons and the three Har-
rier GR 7 units (or an equivalent number of squadrons) with a navalised Ty-
phoon would ensure that there were more than enough aircraft available for the
CV(F).37
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Although it is currently unlikely that the Typhoon would ever become the
sole combat type in the U.K. inventory, its use in the strike role as an early re-
placement for the Tornado is not an impossible scenario. This could make a
navalised version more attractive, since it would slash servicing and training
costs, thanks to commonality.38 There are a number of pitfalls with an air capa-
bility employing just one type; still, the point is that a STOBAR Typhoon might
offer a number of cost benefits that a government concerned with defence
spending would be hard pressed to ignore.39
The Typhoon is not the only option. The Dassault Rafale M offers the advan-
tage of being already available. There is little doubt that it is a capable airplane,
and it has the swing-role flexibility offered by the Typhoon. Although the com-
monality aspect would be lost, the closer defence cooperation enjoyed between
France and the United Kingdom since the mid-1990s suggests that the Rafale
option would not face insurmountable obstacles. The RAF and French forces al-
ready run exchange programmes, and it is not impossible to envisage some form
of joint operational-conversion unit, along the lines of the now-defunct Tri-National
Tornado Training Establishment.
The precedents for such cooperation, however, are not altogether good. Euro-
pean defence projects have broken down over disputes about work sharing and
requirements.40 The Typhoon programme, after all, has been severely delayed.
The aircraft (as the Eurofighter) was meant to serve with the United Kingdom,
Germany, France, Spain, and Italy; the vigorous disputes over which country
should lead the design led to the project’s first acronym, FEFA (Future European
Fighter Aircraft), being rendered in some aviation journals in unflattering
ways.41 The concept-development stage of the Eurofighter saw the departure of
the French, who built the Rafale instead.42 The political wrangling that ensued
from increasing German opposition to the Typhoon delayed the in-service date
for the aircraft dramatically; meant to achieve initial operational capability in
the early nineties, the first Typhoon will not enter service with the Royal Air
Force until 2002. The costs of the programme have risen drastically as a result.43
While this experiece suggests that a combined European defence force is un-
likely in the near term, the idea of some degree of cooperation over CV(F) ought
not to be ruled out. The Royal Navy could purchase a ski-ramp-equipped
Charles de Gaulle–class carrier or two—although one hopes that any future ves-
sels of that class will have power plants that function as advertised and decks
large enough to accommodate their whole air groups. Although the Royal Navy
seems not to want a nuclear-powered vessel, it would appear that the cost advan-
tages (developmental and trials-related engineering expenses, etc., would be
small) of adopting a STOBAR Charles de Gaulle–class ship might outweigh this
objection.44 This would provide a European carrier capability; the Royal Navy
J O R D A N 7 3
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would foot far lower development costs, since these would have been absorbed
by the French, and there would be commonality of aircraft types as well.
Consequently, the STOBAR option is plausible, with the choice between an exist-
ing aircraft type, the Rafale (which will be fully mature technology in 2012, but
not outdated), and the slightly newer–design Typhoon, which is generally reck-
oned to be more capable. If the Typhoon proves suitable for carrier use, the deci-
sion between the two types would be difficult, but the difficulty would not be of
the unwelcome sort. Whether, however, the short-takeoff-but-arrested-recovery
option is the best for the Royal Navy is another issue. There is a compelling rea-
son to suspect that Britain will procure another STOVL carrier—the Joint Strike
Fighter.
STOVL: The Preferred Option?
Notwithstanding the scenarios in which a STOBAR vessel might prove at-
tractive, there are strong reasons for the Royal Navy to continue to operate
short-takeoff-and-vertical-landing vessels. This contention arises both from the
nature of STOVL operations and from the United Kingdom’s involvement in the
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). The programmatic details of JSF are well known and
beyond the scope of this article; the upshot is that although there are technologi-
cal concerns, particularly with regard to the STOVL variant, cancelation seems
highly unlikely. With its clearly projected costs for each version, the JSF is not an
obvious candidate for the major overruns that lead to cancelation.
Furthermore, the Joint Strike Fighter is being relied upon to replace a huge
number of aircraft, in a number of air arms. Outside the United States, it is
the likely replacement for many F-16s and possibly F/A-18s. If the JSF is not
procured, some other type will have to be. For the U.S. Marine Corps, the loss of
the STOVL JSF—and in fact the programme is in jeopardy in the Defense De-
partment’s current Quadrennial Defense Review—would be a serious blow,
demanding either the updating of the AV-8B or a fundamental change in Marine
aviation doctrine. This vulnerability prompted Lieutenant General Fred McCorkle,
USMC, Deputy Chief of Staff for Aviation, to comment, “This nation has all its
eggs in one basket.”45
If the Royal Navy chooses a STOVL vessel, all of its aviation eggs will be in the
same basket. It might therefore be said that the STOVL Joint Strike Fighter is a
programme that will be made to work, since failure cannot be regarded as an op-
tion for two major customers. Even so, there are potential technical pitfalls with
a supersonic STOVL type, and it is likely that the Marine Corps will be awaiting
the flight-testing results with some anxiety. This will also be the case for Britain.
Britain has become a full collaborative partner in the JSF programme, and it
has invested considerable sums in the project. It must be recalled that British
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defence spending has edged inexorably downward for the last forty years; it is
hard to envisage the JSF expenditure to date as a mere expression of interest in
the project. This said, the cancelation of P.1154, TSR 2, F-111K, and Nimrod
AEW 3 after prodigious expenditure makes procurement of the JSF less than a
certainty.
Even given general confidence, however, that the Joint Strike Fighter will en-
ter British service, a major concern remains: whether the STOVL JSF will work
as planned. Supersonic VSTOL aircraft have been attempted before, and the
competing design teams admit
that the risk attached to the
STOVL option is the greatest in
the entire JSF programme. Appar-
ently even simple and elegant
technological and engineering so-
lutions sometimes fail to work as advertised, and the inherent difficulties of
short takeoffs and vertical landings make this more of a risk. Since the STOVL
variant is only part of the programme, technical difficulties with it will not
wreck the Joint Strike Fighter. Most customers will employ the CTOL version,
and whether the STOVL variant works is not a concern to them. It is the U.S. Ma-
rine Corps and the Royal Navy that will suffer most if the STOVL JSF does not
become a reality.
If the STOVL variant runs into development problems or escalating costs, the
United Kingdom may well look for another carrier aircraft, employing the con-
ventional Joint Strike Fighter in a few squadrons to meet its commitments to the
programme. The problem here is that the choice of carrier platform will be
made before the STOVL JSF is proven (unless it suffers major problems that in-
stantly rule it out). If a STOVL platform is chosen with the intent to fly the Joint
Strike Fighter, but the aircraft fails, the Royal Navy will have little option but to
upgrade its Harriers. It may well be that attrition and the fatigue life remaining
for the Harriers precludes an upgrade; there is also the issue of whether it would
be better to use the Harrier GR 9 as the basis for an upgrade or to reopen the
GR 9 production line.46 Commentator Roy Braybrook has argued that the U.S.
Marine Corps and the RAF should not contemplate procurement of STOVL JSF
but should instead rely on an upgraded Harrier GR 9/AV-8B with “improved ra-
dar and long range missiles.”47 In the event of STOVL JSF cancelation, it is likely
that the GR 7/AV-8B would be used as the basis for the replacement type.
If the STOVL JSF does work, however, it will provide a number of clear bene-
fits. It will offer the Royal Air Force the capability to operate from austere loca-
tions, even without runways. With an apparently increasing British commitment
to peacekeeping—which usually occurs in areas where aviation infrastructure
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either has been destroyed or never existed—this is important.48 For the naval ele-
ment of a joint British force, JSF has several advantages over all other types in
operations from the CV(F). The most obvious are that short takeoff and vertical
landings remove the need for arresting gear, and for any launching system be-
yond the ski jump.
More generally, operations with the Invincible class have already demonstrated
the manifest advantages that STOVL has over CTOL. These can be characterised
as means of operability. First, because of the ski jump, a STOVL aircraft always
leaves the deck on an upward trajectory, preventing a potentially dangerous lack
of clearance between aircraft and ocean in rough seas with a pitching deck. Sec-
ond, the likelihood of a “fouled deck” (from which aircraft can be neither
launched nor recovered because others are in the way, either being moved or
suddenly broken down) is far less acute. The vertical landing capability allows
STOVL types to land even if their usual landing spots are blocked. There are no
“bolters” (forced last-instant decisions of pilots not to land) on STOVL vessels;
it has been proven that even when the carrier is blanketed in thick fog, with the
pilot unable to see the vessel, landing is possible. During the Falklands conflict,
one pilot returned from patrol to Invincible in just such weather conditions and
nearly out of fuel. A searchlight was shone upward from the carrier, through the
fog, and the pilot descended following the beam.49 Finally, the STOVL type can
land on vessels that are not designed to operate it. This was taken to extremes in
June 1983 by Sub-Lieutenant Ian Watson, who, through lack of fuel, could not
return to the carrier; he instead landed on a passing Spanish merchant ship, the
Alraigo. This saved an aircraft that would otherwise have had to be abandoned. It
is not difficult to envisage situations where the ability to land aboard other ves-
sels in a battle group would be advantageous.50 The United Kingdom has already
commissioned HMS Ocean as an LPH, and that ship could operate a small num-
ber of STOVL types if need be.51
Although it has now become something of a cliché in British circles, the
maxim “It’s far easier to stop, then land, than to land, then stop” has more than a
grain of truth to it. It describes the manner of short-takeoff-and-vertical-landing
operations perfectly. A 1992 report by the Center for Naval Analyses suggested
that naval STOVL aircraft could undertake 25 percent more sorties than a
conventional-takeoff-and-landing type over a five-hundred-nautical-mile radius
in a twelve-hour period; if the radius of action were reduced to 250 nautical
miles, the STOVL type could generate 40 percent more.52
To summarise, the STOVL vessel offers the ability to operate aircraft in
weather conditions that would not be acceptable for CTOL types; it reduces the
number of personnel required, by employing neither catapult nor arresting gear.
Accordingly, the STOVL vessel can be cheaper and generate more sorties than a
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CTOL carrier. For the Royal Navy, it is hard to see how there can be any objection
to continuing to use STOVL vessels when these offer such great efficiencies com-
pared to conventional types.
The major objection to STOVL appears to be that the Harrier and Sea Harrier
are essentially limited in their technological advancement. Even this is debatable,
however, since the technology of the Rolls-Royce Pegasus engine was advanced for
its day; Rolls Royce has carried out continuous upgrading of and research on the
engine, and further improvements are to be expected. As noted earlier, a key fac-
tor that is often overlooked when comparing the Sea Harrier and the more
up-to-date AV-8B/Harrier GR 7 with other combat aircraft is that the former
are fundamentally first-generation designs, employing 1950s engineering with
1980s modifications overlaid by 1990s technology. The only means of achieving
adequate vertical and short-takeoff-and-landing performance without unacceptable
weight penalties when the P.1127 prototype was designed was the single-engine
vectored nozzle. This imposed certain limitations on the size of the aircraft,
particularly on its internal volume. The Sea Harrier, Harrier GR 1/GR 3, and
AV-8A/C, therefore, were all small combat aircraft. The AV-8B/Harrier GR 7 im-
proved the airframe, avionics, and load-carrying capacity, but they were still tied
to the vectored-nozzle system. Perhaps its most notable limitation, if the least
relevant to operational efficiency, is that the vectored-nozzle engine does not al-
low supersonic flight.53 This has always received far too much consideration; su-
personic performance has for too long been regarded as something that fighter
and attack aircraft must have. The only two Western designs of note without it
since the late 1960s have been the A-10 and the Harrier family.54 It is notable that
these two types have always received only grudging respect (if any); even
highly impressive results in combat have not saved them from verbal “friendly
fire.” In the case of the Harrier, although General Norman Schwarzkopf an-
nounced that the AV-8B had been one of the key weapon systems in DESERT
STORM, there were more than enough people prepared to criticise the AV-8B
for its vulnerability to infrared-guided surface-to-air missiles rather than
point out its effectiveness. While there is truth in this criticism of the AV-8B, it
does not undermine the overall effectiveness of STOVL operations, and partic-
ularly not from aircraft carriers.
NOT AN OPTION BUT A NECESSITY
In light of all this, what is the best option for the Royal Navy for its future carrier
operations? The conventional-takeoff-and landing carrier seems the least likely
option, given the expense associated with the ship itself and the complement
required to support the air wing. The choice between short-takeoff-but-arrested-
recovery and short-takeoff-and-vertical-landing is more difficult to assess. If the
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STOVL variant of the Joint Strike Fighter performs as planned, it will be ex-
tremely difficult to argue in favour of STOBAR. Still, the issue of how good an
air-combat machine JSF is will need to be resolved before we can be absolutely
certain that the Royal Navy will take delivery of the type. It should also be re-
called that recent threats to the
F-22 programme led to assertions
that were F-22 procurement to be
reduced (or cut entirely), the JSF
would have to be redesigned to make it suitable for the air-superiority role.55 The
Typhoon is claimed (by both its manufacturers and independent experts) to be
the next-best air combat type after the F-22 (and less expensive), which may give
it an advantage over rivals for procurement by the Royal Navy.
In spite of this, STOVL JSF would appear to offer a level of operational flexi-
bility that neither a navalised Typhoon nor the Rafale could provide. The major
difficulty with the Joint Strike Fighter is uncertainty whether the STOVL variant
can be developed without major technical difficulties. We should know the an-
swer in the not-too-distant future, although it appears that the programme may
be subjected to some delay.56 If it works, the probability is that the JSF will oper-
ate from British carrier decks from 2012 as part of a joint Royal Air Force/Royal
Navy force; STOVL is clearly the most flexible and affordable option for a power
of Britain’s size. The difficulty is whether even the huge advances in technology
since the P.1127 metamorphosed into the Harrier and Sea Harrier have been
enough to advance STOVL from a proven but still developing system into a truly
flexible weapon system. If not, defence officials will have to consider the options
very carefully, and they will have to make some difficult choices.
One choice will not be available—to abandon the aircraft carrier entirely.
Britain has tried this once, and for all the later success of the Invincible class, it
had reasons to regret the decision, including a number of sunken vessels in the
South Atlantic. This bitter experience makes clear the lack of carrier-based
airpower would demand a fundamental shift in British foreign policy. There has
already been such a shift since the end of the Cold War, and not toward less in-
volvement. The current government purports to pursue an ethical foreign policy
(despite some awkward contradictions); it has made this intention clear with its
continuing support of action against Saddam Hussein, operations over Kosovo,
and the deployment of troops to East Timor. Although in all three cases Britain’s
contributions have not been the largest, they still represent a deployment of sig-
nificant proportions of British military resources.
The Strategic Defence Review does nothing to suggest that there will be a scal-
ing down of this support for humanitarian intervention and attacks against dic-
tatorial states. Britain’s new foreign policy paradigm demands flexibility and
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deployability. Even with the procurement of a strategic airlifter for the Royal Air
Force (after much confusion), deployability will still be heavily dependent upon
naval airpower.57 This is true now, and the CV(F) will be of immeasurable value
when it eventually arrives. If the design of the vessel and the aircraft type to be
operated from it are still far from clear, one thing is obvious. If Britain is to con-
tinue in the post–Cold War world in the role it has set out for itself, carrier-based
air power is not an option. It is a necessity.
N O T E S
1. See Derek Wood, Project Cancelled (London:
MacDonald and Jane’s, 1975), pp. 207–24.
The Admiralty did not appear to want the
P.1154 and ensured that its requirements for
the aircraft were almost diametrically op-
posed to the RAF’s needs.
2. Cynics could also suggest that the F-4K Phan-
tom clearly required a CTOL carrier, thus en-
suring that the new carrier would not be of
the smaller VSTOL types. Less cynically, it
could be pointed out that the Phantom was
obviously a great aircraft already. To take the
technical risk of procuring the P.1154 when
there was a suitable aircraft available ap-
peared pointless. Although the Royal Navy
operated only one squadron of Phantoms at
sea, this was a result of changing government
policy and the abandonment of conventional
carriers. Had the CVA-01 programme gone
ahead with full replacement of then-extant
carriers, at least five squadrons (and possibly
six) would have been required.
3. These modifications included an extendable
nosewheel strut to provide the correct angle
of attack on takeoff, given the shorter carrier
decks of the Royal Navy. This was mainly for
reasons of the increased thrust provided by
the Rolls-Royce Spey engine, but the political
imperative of generating jobs in the British
aviation industry demanded a high U.K.-built
content for the F-4K. The Spey was also in-
stalled in the RAF version, in spite of the fact
that the RAF did not want or need the engine;
the Spey had a slower afterburner-lightup
time and was less fuel efficient than the stan-
dard J-79. The net result of the Spey installa-
tion and the high amount of subcontracting
led RAF pilots, however much they loved the
aircraft, to describe them as the most
expensive, noisiest, and slowest Phantoms in
the world.
4. For the design of CVA-01, see David Hobbs,
Aircraft Carriers of the Royal and Common-
wealth Navies (London: Greenhill Books,
1996), pp. 249–50.
5. HMS Albion, Bulwark, Centaur, and Hermes
were all of the Centaur class, with origins as
light fleet carriers in the Second World War.
There were substantial variations in each ves-
sel, with Hermes often being regarded as a
separate class by itself. In the early 1960s,
Albion and Bulwark were converted to carry
Royal Marine commandos, deployed by heli-
copter; they were roughly equivalent to the
U.S. LPH in concept. Centaur was paid off in
1965 and used as an accommodation vessel.
Of the fleet carriers, Victorious was the oldest,
having entered service in 1941. It was modi-
fied extensively between 1950 and 1958, after
which it was arguably one of the most ad-
vanced vessels in any navy. Again, in compar-
ison with the carriers operated by the U.S.
Navy, the Victorious air group was limited,
with a maximum of thirty-six aircraft. Her-
mes could manage twenty-eight Sea Vixens,
Scimitars, and Buccaneers; by the 1970s,
however, only the Buccaneer was a truly via-
ble combat type. Thanks to typically parsimo-
nious defence spending, the Scimitar never
received the avionics fit it needed to become a
multirole aircraft. In its basic form it could
carry four 30 mm cannon and early guided
weapons, such as the Bullpup and AIM-9B.
6. Although Victorious might have managed to
take Phantoms, more than thirty aircraft
would have been a tight fit. Since at least ten
aircraft would have been AEW Gannets and
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Sea King and Wessex helicopters, this limita-
tion would have reduced the effectiveness of
the air group.
7. It was argued that this would be too costly,
but it is difficult to find any authoritative
source that accepts the validity of this
reasoning.
8. The only aircraft types in the RAF’s inventory
designed for such air defence work (apart
from the Hawker Hunter, which had begun
life as an interceptor but was by the late 1960s
used for ground attack) were the F-4 and the
English Electric Lightning. In the early to
mid-1970s, the RAF’s Phantom fleet was
committed to Germany in the strike role. Af-
ter the introduction of the SEPECAT Jaguar,
the Phantom was transferred to the air de-
fence of the United Kingdom and thus would
not be readily available to defend the fleet. In
any case, how the RAF was to defend carriers
in the middle of the Atlantic was never quite
explained. The F-4 could not manage this,
even with tanker support. Although the
Lightning must rank as one of the great
fighter designs (it gave an excellent account
of itself in exercises against the F-14, F-15,
and F-16 even in the late 1980s), its endur-
ance was appalling. Designed as a point inter-
ceptor, even with in-flight refuelling the
Lightning could not have maintained a com-
bat air patrol over the fleet. In actuality, air
defence of the Royal Navy was effectively left
to the U.S. Navy—one of whose carriers, it
was hoped, would be available to support
operations.
9. This had been trialed by the United King-
dom, West Germany, and the U.S. Marine
Corps in 1966, including landings on the USS
Independence (CV 62) and small-deck tests on
the dock transport USS Raleigh (LPD 1).
10. The CVSG had no arresting gear or catapults,
and the Navy began to present it to politi-
cians as a “through-deck cruiser,” which
would operate an air complement of antisub-
marine helicopters, with a few VSTOL air-
craft (obviously Harriers) to defend against
Soviet reconnaissance aircraft. The designa-
tion of the new class as a “cruiser” was barely
plausible—the ship was cynically referred to
as a “see-through cruiser”—and caused prob-
lems to begin with, since the type was initially
meant to carry not fixed-wing aircraft but the
Exocet antishipping missile to provide
offensive firepower. Had the CVSG been de-
signed to carry VSTOLs from the outset, it is
likely that it would have been bigger, to give it
a meaningful air group.
11. By 1972, although the decision to withdraw
conventional carriers was not likely to have
been reversed, it had been decided that a na-
val version of the Harrier would be accept-
able. Such a machine, while not offering the
capabilities of an F-4 or a Buccaneer, could at
least provide limited air defence for the
through-deck cruisers—now the Invincible
class—while they conducted their primary
mission.
12. There was considerable public support for
the Ark Royal after a BBC TV series on the
ship. Public feeling was so strong that the
planned HMS Indomitable was renamed.
13. The Hermes was withdrawn from British ser-
vice in 1985, after a period in reserve, and was
sold to India, where it is now the Viraat.
14. The Ark Royal’s air wing normally consisted
of twelve F-4 Phantoms, fourteen Blackburn
Buccaneers, three Fairey Gannet airborne
early warning aircraft, and six Sea King anti-
submarine helicopters. Two Westland Wes-
sex helicopters were also embarked in the
search-and-rescue role, and occasionally a
single carrier-onboard-delivery variant of the
Gannet.
15. It might also be pointed out that the Royal
Navy was subjected to savage cuts in the 1981
defence review. Under this, Invincible was to
be sold to Australia. Had the Argentine lead-
ership waited a few more months before in-
vading, Britain would not have had the forces
to mount the operation. Ironically, the man
who came up with the ruinous review,
Defence Secretary John Nott, was knighted in
the aftermath of the Falklands campaign. It is
arguable that without the review (which also
called for withdrawing the patrol ship Endur-
ance from the South Atlantic), Argentina
might have judged that invading the
Falklands was too much of a risk.
16. Later, after conversion to the commando car-
rier role, Hermes was fitted with a ski ramp,
allowing it to operate Sea Harriers, thus pro-
viding an interim vessel for use while the
three Invincible-class vessels were being built.
The air wing on both carriers was reinforced,
bringing the number of Harriers above the
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twenty-six fighter and attack aircraft em-
barked by Ark Royal.
17. Thanks to the support of the United States,
the Royal Navy was able to draw on Nato
stocks of the AIM-9L all-aspect variant rather
than use the then-standard AIM-9G.
18. The vertical takeoff requires far more fuel
and reduces payload; thus it makes much
more operational sense for the Harrier to be-
gin with a short takeoff run.
19. The only solution was to modify a number of
Sea King helicopters to carry the EMI
Searchwater radar in a large, inflatable ra-
dome mounted on the side. The modification
programme began while the conflict was in
progress, but the first conversion did not ar-
rive until the fighting was over.
20. The Argentine carrier, the Veinticinco de
Mayo, was not employed. A planned strike on
the British fleet from its deck was aborted for
lack of wind; shortly afterward, the cruiser
Belgrano was sunk by the fleet submarine
HMS Conqueror. The Argentine fleet did not
venture toward the Falklands again.
21. It was said that the British carriers were so far
east of the Falklands that their crews qualified
for the Burma Star.
22. It ought to be noted that the Argentine air
force’s Mirage and Dagger aircraft had much
the same problem. Even taking into account
the fact that they had longer journeys to and
from the combat zone, the air-to-air arma-
ment of the Mirage III and its variants was
not particularly impressive.
23. Peter E. Davies and Anthony M. Thorn-
borough, The Harrier Story (London: Arms
and Armour Press, 1996), pp. 161–8. Al-
though it is a potent machine, the Sea Har-
rier’s armament is limited. It invariably carries
two 190-gallon fuel tanks under the inner
wing pylons, as without them its range is pro-
hibitively short. This leaves room for just two
AIM-120s under the wings. Two more can be
placed under the fuselage, but if they are, the
30 mm gun pods have to be off-loaded; for
situations such as policing no-fly zones—
where the ability to fire warning shots is use-
ful—this is a problem. (This issue has been
ignored for ridiculously small financial gains
in the RAF’s forthcoming Typhoons, which
the current government intends not to equip
with a gun solely to save money on support
costs.) The Sea Harriers usually fly with a mix
of two AMRAAMs (advanced medium-range
air-to-air missiles) and two gun pods in these
circumstances, or replace the AIM-120s with
the AIM-9M Sidewinder. The Sea Harrier can
also carry ground-attack weapons, but the use
of the Harrier GR 7 from carrier decks has
seen a dramatic reduction in the use of the
Sea Harrier for attack missions. Additionally,
AIM-120s carried on the fuselage positions
have been damaged by heat and vibration. At
the end of the deployment of Sea Harriers in
support of Operation ALLIED FORCE (the
1999 Kosovo campaign), around half the
AIM-120s embarked upon Invincible had
been rendered unserviceable by this cause.
24. The Harrier GR 7 is a very different machine
from the Harrier of 1982. The “big wing”
Harrier has a far greater load-carrying capa-
bility than the Sea Harrier, with eight under-
wing hardpoints (two dedicated for the use of
Sidewinder), compared to the Sea Harrier’s
four. As recently seen over Kosovo, the GR 7
can easily provide self-designation for laser-
guided weapons, through the TIALD system,
mounted on an under-fuselage pylon. The
combination of Sea Harrier and Harrier GR 7
provides greatly increased flexibility for Brit-
ish maritime operations. The GR 7 (as well as
the GR 5 model, which preceded it) suffered
at first from a number of problems affecting
the engine and weapons. One of these prob-
lem areas was the new 25 mm ADEN cannon,
specially designed for the Harrier GR 5/GR 7;
after years of trying to integrate it with the
Harrier’s weapon system, it was decided to
abandon the idea. The considerably less ad-
vanced 30 mm ADEN (based on the German
30 mm cannon designs of 1944–45) still func-
tions perfectly, but it can only be carried by
the Sea Harrier. All the surviving GR 5 air-
craft have now been upgraded to the GR 7
standard.
25. This criticism usually revolves around the
capabilities of the Sea Harrier. In spite of its
upgrade, it must be recalled, the Sea Harrier
is a first-generation STOVL type, based on the
P.1127, which was never designed to carry a
war load. The Harrier GR 7, as an evolved,
second-generation type, gives better insight
into the potentialities of STOVL for naval use.
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26. It is not hard to posit such a scenario—for
example, had Italy not permitted the use of its
airfields for Nato operations against Serbia, the
only nearby alternatives were either not
Nato-compatible (e.g., in Hungary) or not
adequate (as in Albania).
27. The Strategic Defence Review, Command Paper
3999 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Of-
fice, 1998).
28. Ibid.
29. The Sea Harrier force is moving to the RAF
base at Cottesmore to be in closer proximity
to the RAF’s Harriers: two squadrons operate
from Cottesmore and two more from the
nearby base at Wittering, which is literally
just a few miles down the A1.
30. Richard Scott and Mike Wells, “Flexing Joint
Muscle: Mixed Air Groups aboard Carriers,”
Jane’s Navy International, December 1997,
pp. 14–22.
31. The provision of catapults and arresting gear
adds cost to the vessel, and the joint nature of
future operations means training of RAF pi-
lots to conduct carrier landings as an
unlooked-for complication that would add
expense, which many perceive as pointless
when STOVL types have worked so well for
the United Kingdom.
32. See David Foxwell, “New Waves of Sea
Power,” Jane’s International Defence Review,
February 1997, p. 34.
33. See the discussion section after David James,
“British Naval Doctrine and the Future
Equipment Programme,” in Maritime Avia-
tion: Light and Medium Aircraft Carriers into
the Twenty-first Century, ed. Peter Hore and
Thomas J. Hirschfield (Hull, U.K.: Univ. of
Hull Press, 1999), p.115.
34. See “Sea Legs for Typhoon?” retrieved from
the World Wide Web:
http://eurofightertyphoon.com.
35. This factor (among others, of course) led to
the adoption of the F/A-18 over the F-16 by
the U.S. Navy; the F-16 was felt not to have
the necessary development potential for
carrierborne operations. The Royal Navy has
experience with aircraft that are not strong
enough for carrier operations. Although the
Seafire (navalised Spitfire) was highly re-
garded, for instance, it was more prone to
landing accidents and downtime than other
types.
36. This is speculation on the part of the author,
who is not entirely convinced that procuring
navalised Typhoons would reduce the overall
unit cost of the aircraft. The costs of develop-
ing the aircraft might well be greater than the
savings made by having a single, national de-
sign authority.
37. The key issue here would be training pilots of
the RAF squadrons to land on carriers, dis-
cussed above, but perhaps more relevant is
the role portrayed for the Typhoon in RAF
service. It has already been mooted as a con-
tender—in modified form—for the Follow-on
Offensive Aircraft System (FOAS), which will
replace the Tornado GR 4. Defence spending
priorities may well cause more Typhoons to
be purchased to replace Tornados in some
squadrons before the FOAS is chosen. Since
the early 1990s, Ministry of Defence policy,
even if unstated, has been to reduce the num-
ber of types in the RAF’s inventory. The Buc-
caneer and Phantom were withdrawn some
years before schedule; the Jaguar fleet was
constantly targeted for retirement until the
Jaguar GR 3 upgrade added vastly improved
capability at a very low price. It also demon-
strated that requirements unique to one
country enabled the problems of collabora-
tive ventures to be swept aside with ease.
38. Currently, the RAF possesses the following
types in the following number of combat air-
craft squadrons (including operational con-
version units): Tornado F3, six; Tornado GR
1/GR 4, eight; Jaguar GR 3, four; Harrier GR
7, four; and Sea Harrier, three. The Typhoon
is scheduled to replace all the Tornado F 3
and Jaguar units. It is anticipated that the to-
tal of 232 will permit the formation of ten
frontline squadrons and a training unit to
teach both air-to-air and air-to-ground oper-
ations. If the Harriers were replaced with
navalised Typhoons, the number of “opera-
tional conversion units” (OCU—equivalent
to the U.S. Navy’s fleet readiness squadrons)
could be reduced from the current five to two
(one Typhoon, one Tornado).
39. A problem with this scenario might be
whether one OCU for the Typhoon would be
enough. The question of whether it would be
wise to rely upon one aircraft type would also
have to be considered.
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40. This is to say nothing of the creation of a
European defence force. A number of senior
European politicians have called for the for-
mation of European armed services. It should
be noted that British politicians are not
among them. It is probably fair to say that the
British electorate’s respect for its armed ser-
vices and its often suspicious attitude toward
foreigners (at least those who do not speak
English as their native language) make it un-
likely to take kindly to the politician who ini-
tiates the transfer of British forces to
supranational control. Aside from British in-
sularity (or xenophobia), there is consider-
able anecdotal evidence that the idea might
not work. It is not widely known, but some
French units in Bosnia refused to speak any-
thing other than French to their colleagues
(this from a conversation between the author
and a British officer who served in Bosnia).
French spirits rose when a French Canadian
unit arrived, but the differences between Ca-
nadian and “metropolitan” French were such
that the Canadians decided that they would
rather use English.
41. See the “Straight and Level” column in Flight
International on many occasions in the
mid-1980s for full explication of the term.
42. It is not unfair to say that the departure of
Avions Marcel Dassault was met with relief
from the other nations. Dassault has devel-
oped an unfortunate reputation for promot-
ing its own products at the expense even of
collaborative programmes with which it is in-
volved. This led to the Aeronavale (French
naval aviation) receiving the Super Etendard
instead of the SEPECAT Jaguar M, which was
arguably the better aircraft. See World Air
Power Journal, vol. 35, p. 68, for particular
reference to the Eurofighter Typhoon.
43. Ibid, pp. 54–97. The Eurofighter story became
almost farcical. When it was announced that
the aircraft was to be named the Typhoon,
objections by the Germans (who felt it tact-
less to name the aircraft after one that had
killed many Germans in the Second World
War) led to the compromise that it would be
known as the Typhoon only for export cus-
tomers. The RAF was thus faced with the
prospect of having the “Eurofighter” as its
main combat type.
44. The Charles de Gaulle suffered embarrassing
power-plant problems (related to auxiliary
engines, not the nuclear reactor) on its
maiden voyage, being forced to return to port
early. It was also discovered that the flight
deck was not large enough for its E-2C early
warning planes to manoeuvre safely. See
“Carrier Concerns,” Jane’s Navy Interna-
tional, March 1999, p. 8; and “Up Close:
Charles de Gaulle Finds Its Sea Legs,” Jane’s
Navy International, November 1999, pp. 10–1.
45. “Osprey Crash and JSF Doubts Hit USMC
Aircraft Plans,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 19
April 2000, p. 11.
46. The Harrier GR 7 is to be improved to the
GR 9 standard with the addition of new
avionics.
47. See Roy Braybrook, “VSTOL: Reflections 40
Years On,” Air International, October 1999,
pp. 235–40.
48. Operations in such cases, though, are unlikely
to take the form of the 1970s and 1980s,
when Harrier GR 3s operated from forest
clearings using short runways of pierced steel
planking, or from shopping-mall car parks. It
is more likely that austerely equipped airports
would be employed instead, with the STOVL
capability removing the need for long, well-
maintained runways.
49. N. D. “Sharkey” Ward [Cdr., RN], Sea Har-
rier over the Falklands (London: Orion, 1993),
pp. 317–8.
50. See Davies and Thornborough, pp. 161–2.
51. Short takeoffs would not be possible, since
one of Ocean’s close-in weapon systems
would be in direct line of a takeoff run;
VTOL would be the only option.
52. Most recently cited in Combat Aircraft: The
International Journal of Military Aviation,
May–June 1999, p. 144.
53. Supersonic performance might be given to
the Harrier through the use of a technique
known as “plenum chamber burning.” This
has been under test for many years but has
never been introduced for operational
service.
54. There have, of course, been other, less well
known, types, such as the Italian/Brazilian
AMX (the obscurity of which seems a little
unfair).
55. See “Raptor under Threat,” Air Forces
Monthly, September 1999, p. 4. Also, see
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“United States Navy Today: Part 1, the Car-
rier Air Wing,” Air International, August
1999, pp. 100–6, where Tony Holmes posits
the view that “JSF is effectively a bomber with
a strong fighter capability, more f/A than F/a.”
56. “Osprey Crash,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, p. 11.
57. The SDR identified a need for a heavy-lift ca-
pability for the RAF and called for the interim
leasing of “C-17 class” aircraft to fulfill the
role. Much to commentators’ surprise, the
strategic airlifter was canceled in 1999. There-
after it became increasingly apparent, how-
ever, that UK defence commitments demand
this type of aircraft, and the requirement was
reinstated.
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